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Experimental Test of Some Notions of The Fact/ Opinion Distinction in Libel 
Jeremy Cohen, Diana Mutz, Clifford Nass and Laurie Mason 
Opinion caused more harm to reputation than fact in this experiment. 
Courts must decide under the rules of American libel law whether a defamatory statement is a 
statement of opinion or of fact. Implicit in the law are assumptions about the manner in which readers 
distinguish between fact and opinion, a fact that suggests value in exploring the criteria people use to 
make such distinctions. 
American law actually distinguishes among three types of defamatory statements. Statements of fact 
that are true receive nearly absolute protection.1 Statements of fact that are false subject the author to 
liability, although numerous defenses based on the author's conduct and the content of the message are 
available that may mitigate or eviscerate such liability.2 Statements of opinion, no matter how vitriolic in 
nature, are protected from libel suits.3  
Opinion  
After nearly two centuries of varying levels of state by state common law protection, the Supreme Court 
found a First Amendment recognition of the fact/opinion distinction in 1974 when Justice Powell held in 
Gertz v. Welch that,  
Under the First Amendment, there is no such thing as a false idea. However pernicious 
an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of judges and 
juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there is no constitution.al value in false 
statements of fact. 4 
 
Since Gertz, the arena of safe opinion has encompassed all topics, not just the political speech protected 
in most common law. The legal theory underlying the Gertz dicta on opinion is that only statements that 
can be proved or disproved may be considered defamatory and therefore subject to redress for harm to 
reputation.  
A recurring problem has been the difficulty or developing a suitable legal distinction that can be applied 
consistently. In the end, statements accepted by one reader as opinion may be interpreted by another 
as fact. A suit against columnist Ellen Goodman provides a useful example. In 1983, Goodman wrote a 
column highly critical of the outcome of a rape trial that found the defendants not guilty on the rape 
charge, yet guilty of a charge of malicious damage to an automobile involved in the incident. Goodman 
wrote,  
What is agreed upon by everyone is that the men took turns. While one was jumping on 
her, the others were jumping on the car. At the end, the bruised auto was rolled over 
the embankment. The bruised woman was left naked in the January night …. On June 
17, they were found innocent of damaging the woman but-hosanna and pass the scales 
of justice-guilty of damaging the car.5 
 
In the ensuing libel suit against Goodman, the plaintiffs argued that the statement, "while one was 
jumping on her, the others were jumping on the car," was a false statement of fact. The judge found the 
column to be opinion containing no statement of fact. The judge based his decision on the reasoning 
that Goodman, 
uses the rhetorical device or personification to make an automobile a person and by 
adroit cadence of parallel sentences compares the favorable treatment of a motor 
vehicle to the shabby treatment of women in rape cases.6 
 
It is easy to see how some might have seen Goodman's comments as verifiable statements of fact-
especially readers not adroit enough to recognize parallel constructions used as literary device. 
Decisions such as this one call into question the tenet that law must be applied consistently and subject 
the judge to the charge that his decision was based on visceral (if literary) reaction, rather than 
predictable legal rules.  
Further complicating the issue, the Supreme Court did not provide in Gertz a systematic means for either 
federal or state courts to distinguish between fact and opinion statements. The problem was left to 
future cases and at this writing, the High Court has accepted no appeal for hearing that would provide a 
conclusive answer at the national level. Nonetheless, a federal Court of Appeals developed a four-part 
test in 1984 that has received wide attention. The case considered a libel suit against nationally 
syndicated columnists Evans and Novak by a political science professor who had been the subject of 
their column. Evans and Novak questioned the professor's leftist views in their column and argued in 
court that the column was opinion and therefore entitled to First Amendment protection. Writing for a 
plurality in OIiman v. Evans, Judge Starr set four criteria to distinguish fact from opinion.  
1)What is the common usage or meaning of the allegedly defamatory statements?7  
2)To what degree are the statements at issue verifiable as statements of fact?8 
3)What is the micro-context of the statements-that is, what is the tone of the rest of the article 
or story?9 
4)What is the macro-context-that is, do the statements appear on a news or editorial page or in 
a forum regularly recognized as one encouraging opinion?10  
Of special relevance to this study is criterion 4, the macro-context of the statement. Starr found it very 
important that the statements in question appeared in a column and that the column appeared on the 
op/ed page, "the well-recognized home of opinion and comment."11 Page environment, then, is 
assumed to be a primary indicator for readers of whether a statement is fact or opinion.  
In a dissenting opinion, however, Judge Wald was less impressed than Starr by the macro-context in 
which the statements occurred, writing that “the immediate context in which the statement was made 
does little to warn a reader to regard with skepticism what might otherwise appear to be an assertion of 
fact."12 As legal commentator Timothy Gleason has pointed out, "Judge Starr's characterization of the 
context as one in which readers will expect opinion statements is no less credible than Judge Wald's 
assertion that the context supports a finding of fact."13 
Another aspect of macro-context that could assume relevance in fact/opinion deliberations is whether 
the article has a by-line. Although this potential indication has never been addressed by the courts, a 
1985 study commissioned by the American Society of Newspaper Editors (ASNE) found evidence that 
readers tend to equate a by-line with opinion.14 The correlation, explored in more detail below, justifies 
an intitial examination of the possibility under experimental conditions.  
In the process, then, of protecting opinion from libel suits, the courts imbed two implicit assumptions.15 
First, the courts assume that individuals, whether readers of a newspaper, viewers of television, or other 
consumers of information, distinguish between fact and opinion in the messages they receive through 
the mass media. Second, the courts must assume that judicial formulas accurately distinguish between 
fact and opinion.  
With libel suits regularly involving seven figure damage claims,16 these two assumptions become 
important to journalists, publishers, attorneys, judges and the subjects of journalistic scrutiny who 
sometimes turn to the courts to vindicate possibly tarnished reputations.17 A first step toward testing 
these assumptions is to empirically determine whether and how people perceive differences between 
defamatory opinion and factual statements and the effects of these perceptions. Empirical attempts to 
date, however, have been limited in scope and none are applicable directly to specific fact/opinion 
formulas developed by the courts.18  
This paper presents experimental tests of some assumptions about the ways in which readers 
distinguish fact from opinion in a defamatory context, and about differences in impact on readers based 
upon their perceptions of whether a report is fact or opinion.  
We first discuss and test two aspects of the macro-context of an article that might effect a reader's 
perceptions of fact/opinion: page environment and by-line.  
We then empirically examine the differential effect of perception of fact versus opinion on reader 
assessment of the defamed person. The constitutional distinction between fact and opinion is based not 
on the question of whether fact is capable of causing more damage to reputation than opinion, but 
simply on the Gertz rationale that a fact can be proven true or false while an opinion can be neither right 
nor wrong.19 Nonetheless, the fact/opinion distinction seems to carry at least an implicit assumption 
that people recognize differences between fact and opinion and weigh those differences accordingly.  
Page Environment. Courts have developed numerous approaches to making distinctions between 
defamatory statements that are opinion and those that are presented as fact. Page environment is used 
as a criterion in many of these judicial fact/opinion tests. Page environment refers to the characteristics 
of the page on which a newspaper article appears. Is the material on a news page normally associated 
with factual stories, or on a page set aside for editorials, letters to the editor, and opinion columns?  
A basic approach that relics on page environment as a threshold element appeared in OIlman v. Evans.20 
The four federal Courts of Appeal fact/opinion libel cases decided since then have incorporated the 
OIlman guidelines, a strong indicator of an emerging coalescence of approach.21  
In focusing on the issue of whether the defamatory statements in question appeared on a news page or 
on an opinion/editorial page of a newspaper, the judicial assumption is (1) that readers are aware they 
are reading statements placed either on a news page or on an op/ed page; and (2) that readers are 
aware of the difference in function and content of news and op/ed pages; and (3) that these 
recognitions play a significant role in reader perception of whether defamatory statements are fact or 
opinion. 
Contradictory Findings. There are reasons to doubt these assumptions. One-fourth of those polled in the 
ASNE survey believed that “columnists are not entitled to include opinions in their columns."22 About 
half those polled believed the editorial pages contained about the same amount of opinion as the rest of 
the newspapers.23 About one-fourth believed the front page actually contains more opinion than the 
rest of the newspaper.24 The study also found that 40% of readers believe “most media don't do a very 
good job of separating fact from opinion."25  
A similar study, commissioned by the Associated Press Managing Editors Association, found that one in 
four readers believe newspapers “mix fact and opinion."26  
It is easy to conclude from these findings that the appearance of statements on an op/ed page or a news 
page is not a reliable indicator of reader perception. At the least they suggest continued attention to the 
ways in which people distinguish between fact and opinion.  
Byline. Although the courts have not considered by-line as a reliable fact/opinion indicator, 4 of 10 
readers polled by ASNE believed "When a reporter's byline is put on a story, the reporter is entitled to 
put his or her opinions in the story,"27 Implicit in the finding that a significant minority or readers appear 
to misunderstand the meaning or purpose of a by-line is the possibility that readers who equate byline 
with the presence of opinion would incorrectly identify bylined stories, no matter where they appeared, 
as more opinionated than comparable stories that did not have a byline.  
Methods. Fifty-seven Stanford students in a class on communication law28 read a mock two-page 
newspaper comprising a front page and an editorial page. Each page had two articles, one with a byline 
and one without a byline. Thus, environment, byline and their interaction constituted the manipulations 
in the experiment.  
To control for individual differences, we created four forms of the mock newspaper. Each form of the 
newspaper contained the same four articles, with each article chosen to be a) critical of a single 
(pseudonymous) individual and b) at issue in a libel case decided on the basis of the fact/opinion 
distinction.29 The design of the study is a two-by-two Latin square, with each article appearing with a 
different combination of environment and by-line for each of the four forms of the newspaper.30  
The first dependent variable of interest is the extent to which the subjects perceived each article to be 
fact or opinion. Subjects were asked to underline the phrases in each article that they felt were 
statements of opinion rather than statements of fact, whether true or false. We then totaled the 
number of underlined phrases for each article. Later in the experiment, subjects were asked to rate the 
fact/opinion nature of each article as a whole on a 19-point continuous scale ranging from "Mostly 
Opinion" to "Mostly Fact."  
Opinion change is the second issue addressed in our study. We wanted to know which carried greater 
potential for damage to reputation, messages perceived as defamatory facts or those perceived by 
readers as opinion?  
For each of the four persons named in the articles, students were asked to respond to the question, 
"How would you rate your impression of Anthony Collins [i.e., the defamed person)? Would you say that 
your impression of him is:". The question utilized a 19-point continuous scale ranging from "Positive" to 
"Negative." The use of fictitious names in the articles ensured that the subjects did not have strong 
pre-existing attitudes toward the people to be evaluated.  
Results 
The two measures of fact/opinion—the total number of underlined phrases and the subject's overall 
evaluation—showed a low magnitude of correlation (r=.29; p<.001), so separate analyses were run for 
each of the two measures of the dependent variable. Table 1 presents means, by article and treatment 
condition, for the number of opinion statements (underlined phrases). Table 2 presents corresponding 
means for the fact-opinion scale. For page environment, seven of the eight comparisons of the means 
are as predicted, with the eighth showing virtually no difference. The byline/no byline condition shows 
no systematic patterns.  
 
 
 
 
TABLE2  
Mean Scores for Fact/Opinion Nature of the Article. 
 
 
The first step in analyzing the Latin Square design was to control for individual differences and to check 
for possible confounding effects of the four versions of the mock newspaper. As expected, there were 
significant individual differences for both total number of opinion phrases in each article (p < .001) and 
overall evaluations of the articles (p < .01). Fortunately, there was no significant effect for the version of 
TABLE 1 
Mean scores for Number of Opinion Statements per Article by Condition 
 Front Editorial   
 Page Page Byline No Byline 
Dr. Drill 'n Fill 'n Bill 12.1 15.8 13.1 15.1 
New York Tallest Building 14.9 18.0 17.6 15.0 
Marxist Prof’s Intent 20.8 20.7 20.6 20.9 
A Giggle of Guts    9.52 10.7 10.7   9.45 
Cell Ns vary from 26 to 31     
 
 Front Editorial   
 Page Page Byline No Byline 
Dr. Drill 'n Fill 'n Bill 6.9 5.9 6.3 6.4 
New York Tallest Building  5.5 4.6 4.7 5.5 
Marxist Prof’s Intent 5.6 4.8 5.4 5.1 
A Giggle of Guts  6.6 5.9 6.7 5.8 
Cell Ns vary from 26 to 31.     
Scale ranged from 1 = “Mostly Opinion” to 19 = “Mostly Fact” 
the newspaper for either measure (p > .1 and p > .6, respectively), indicating that the articles could be 
viewed as replications of one another as intended in the original design.  
Analyses of variance were done for the relationship between page environment and by-line and the 
total number of underlined phrases. There is a highly significant difference (F(1,53) = 14.0; p < .001))31, 
with articles on the front page seen as having fewer opinion statements than articles on the opinion 
page (Mean = 14.2 vs. 16.4). There is no effect, however, for byline (F(1,53) = .16; p > .5), nor is there a 
significant interaction effect (F(1,53) = .03; p> .5). 
The results for overall evaluation of the article show a similar pattern. Articles on the front page are 
seen as containing significantly less opinion than articles on the opinion page (Mean= 6.1 vs. 5.3; F(1,53) 
= 5.5; p < .05). Again, there is no effect for byline (F( 1,53) = .08; p > .5) and the interaction term is not 
significant (F(1,53) = .00; p > .3). The environment of an article does tend to influence readers' 
perception of how opinionated the article is. Byline, however, does not seem to have an effect on the 
reader's perception of opinion.  
Turning to the second assumption implicit in fact/ opinion issues in libel, we examine the relationship 
between the perception of the extent of opinion in a defamatory article and the reader's evaluation of 
the defamed person to see if perceived factual assertions are truly more damaging than perceived 
statements of opinion. We also test for any effect on damage to reputation for page environment and 
by-line, independent of their effect on the reader's evaluation of fact/ opinion. To test these 
relationships, evaluation of the article's referent is the dependent variable in an analysis of covariance 
model with either total number of opinion statements or overall assessment of how much opinion the 
article contained as a covariate and either page environment or by-line as the independent variable.32 
The results are presented in Table 3.  
 
TABLE 3 
F-Statistics for Effects on Evaluations of Defamed Person 
 
When the total number of opinion statements is used as the measure of how much opinion exists in an 
article, opinion is significantly related to the perception of the referent, in models that include either 
page environment (F(1,53) = 16; p < .01) or by-line (F(1,53) = 17; p < .01). Surprisingly, the direction of 
the relationship is negative; that is, readers who see an article as mostly opinion think less of the 
referent than readers who see the article as mostly fact (r = .23; p < .001). Neither environment (F(1,53) 
Covariate Indep. Effect Covariate F Indep. Effect F Interaction F 
Number of Phrases Environmental 16** 
(1,53) 
2.1 
(1,53) 
1.1 
(1,47) 
Number of Phrases Byline 17** 
(1,53) 
1.1 
(1,53) 
1.2 
(1,47) 
Overall Eval. Environment 4.1* 
(1,53) 
3.8 
(1,53) 
1.7 
(1,47) 
Overall Eval. Byline 3.8 
(1,53) 
1.3 
(1,53) 
.04 
(1,47) 
= 2.1; p > .4) nor byline (F(1,53) = 1.1; p > .5) nor the interaction of environment or by-line with number 
of opinion phrases is significant.  
The results using overall evaluation of an article's fact/opinionness as the covariate show similar though 
weaker results. Opinion is significantly related to perception of the referent in models with either 
environment (F( 1,53) = 4.1; p < .05) or by by-line (F(1,53) = 3.8; p < .08). Consistent with the earlier 
surprising finding, opinion articles are more influential (lead to lower evaluations of the referent) than 
are articles perceived as fact (r = .14; p < .001). Again, environment and by-line are clearly not significant 
when controlling for opinionness of the article (all p > .2).  
Discussion  
The rationale for protecting opinion is thoroughly integrated into the American legal fabric. One year 
after the ratification of the First Amendment, Thomas Jefferson wrote to George Washington, "If there 
be any among us who would wish to dissolve this union or to change its republican form, let them stand 
undisturbed as monuments of the safety with which error of opinion may be tolerated, where reason is 
left free to combat it."33 The plethora of opinion-wrongheaded, controversial, seditious, or otherwise-
that makes up the free marketplace of ideas34 has long been recognized as a linchpin of democratic 
ideals.  
Libel law attempts to incorporate the ideals of the open marketplace of ideas theory Jefferson so 
eloquently penned to Washington. Justice William Brennan's Opinion for the Court in New York Times v. 
Sullivan placed constitutional force behind the notion that even false defamatory statements of fact 
must be tolerated when they are directed at the public actions of public officials and they occur without 
actual malice.35 The marketplace, Brennan reasoned, requires "breathing space" if it is to flourish.36 
Justice William Powell's opinion in Gertz v. Welch expanded the First Amendment foundation protecting 
criticism and required all courts to distinguish between statements of fact and statements of opinion. 
This research focused not on the legal theory underlying the fact/opinion distinction in libel, but on 
assumptions about the manner in which people read newspapers-assumptions that can be found within 
the judicial process. We examined the judicial assumption in Oilman v. Evans that the macro-
environment in which statements appear is an important reader cue. We examined the related 
possibility that byline is an important indicator. We also examined the idea that people react differently 
to opinion statements than to factual statements in terms of reputation.  
Our experimental findings strongly suggest that the macro-context does indeed matter. Placing the 
same article on the op/ed page and on the front page, readers were far more likely to perceived the 
article as opinion when it appeared on the op/ed page. Judge Starr's fourth criteria in Oilman finds 
support here as a means to distinguish between perceived statements of fact and opinion.  
Each of the court's assumptions about page environment that we stated earlier appears borne out by 
the research. In drawing fact/ opinion distinctions readers appear to be aware at some level that they 
are reading statements placed either on a news page or on an op/ed page, and that there is a difference 
in function and content based on placement. Furthermore, these recognitions play a significant role in 
influencing reader perceptions of whether statements are fact or opinion.  
Additional questions about the macro context are ripe for inquiry. Do readers relate differently to 
columns, editorials, and letters to the editor-the standard fare of the op/ed pages? Docs labeling such as 
"news analysis" make a difference in reader perception? Do people react differently to recognized 
bylines (columnist Ellen Goodman's, for example)?  
Our readers did not appear to consider by-line in their determination of whether statements were fact 
or opinion. These results seemingly contradict the expectations suggested by earlier survey research. It 
is possible that our experimental subjects did not attend to the presence or absence of bylines as cues, 
while the survey respondents were asked directly about the significance of bylines as cues, artificially 
bringing the matter to their attention.  
Material for a different debate emerges when we focus on the question of whether subjects were more 
influenced by statements of fact or statements of opinion. In our study, articles perceived as opinion 
appeared to influence readers more than articles perceived as factual. This is actually in line with earlier 
research that found tendency to see negative information as biased and opinionated, regardless of its 
factual basis.37 More negative articles, then, would be expected to produce greater opinion change, and 
would also be seen as more opinionated.  
But while our findings suggest that opinion has the potential to cause equal or greater harm to 
reputation than does the publication of defamatory facts, our experimental environment in no way 
replicated the multitude of voices normally available to citizens. Legal commentator Robert Sack has 
noted that under constitutional law there can be no such thing as a false idea or opinion. As Sack wrote, 
“A defamation is actionable only if it is false; opinions cannot be false; therefore opinions can never be 
actionable even if defamatory.”38 It may be, as the court implies in Gertz, that opinions cannot be 
proven true or false. Yet our research also suggests that opinions may be quite capable of carrying a 
defamatory reputational sting at least as damaging as any factual statement. 
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